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One of the central  predictions  of growth theory,  old and new, is that
income  taxes  have  a negative  effect  on the  pace of economic  expansion. In the
Cass-Koopmans  version  of the  neoclassical  model  and in the  Lucas (1988)  model,
a higher  income  tax  rate  reduces  the  steady-state  ratio  of physical  capital  to
effective  labor  and leads to a temporary  decline in the rate of growth.  In
the 'lab-equipment  model'  of Romer  and  Rivera-Batiz  (1991)  and In the models
of Jones  and  Manuelli (1990)  and  Rebelo  (1991),  increases  in income  taxes  lead
to  permanent  declines  in the  rate  of  economic  expansion. 1
While the study  of the effects  of taxation  in growth  models  continues  to
be an extremely  active  research  area,  there is little  empirical  work on this
topic. This scarcity  of empirical  work is  due to the  difficulties  involved  in
measuring  the  relevant  marginal  tax  rates.
In this paper  we experiment  with a method  of obtaining  average  marginal
income  tax rates that  combines  information  on statutory  rates  with the  amount
of tax  revenue  collected  and  with  data on income  distribution. We apply this
method to the countries included  in Sicat and Virmani's (1988)  summary  of
statutory income tax rates for 1984.  The Sicat-Virmani  data set includes
fifty developing countries  and three industrialized  economies:  the U.S.,
Japan  and Ireland. Our sample  includes  only 32 countries  due to the scarcity
of data  on  income distribution  and on the amount of  income tax revenue
collected  in 1984.
In the next section  we discuss  the  prediction  that the  rate  of growth  is
negatively  related  to an average  marginal  tax rate  on income. In section  III
we describe  our method  for computing  average marginal  tax rates and present
our  estimates of  marginal tax  rates.  A  final  section provides some
conclusion.
1See  Rebelo and Stokey (1992)  for a discussion  of the effects  of taxation  In
models  of the  Lucas (1988)-Uzawa  (1965)  variety.
1II.  Income  Taxation  in the  Linear  Growth  Model
The  effects  of income  taxation  on economic  growth  can  be easily  described
In the  context  of a simple  'AK'  model.  In  this  model  there  is a single  sector
whose output (Yt) is a  linear  function of a  comprehensive  measure of the
capital  stock,  which encompasses  both physical  and human  capital (kt):  yt =
Akt.
Households have  identical preferences,  defined over consumption  (ct)
sequences:
ct  -
u =  -pt  e-  dt,  p>O,  e>0  (1)
u  1  - e
but differ in their  capital  holdings. Given the linearity  of the production
function,  the distribution  of capital  and the  distribution  of pre-tax income
coincide. Both  are  described  by the  p.d.f.  +(y).
An household  with income  y pays taxes according  to the non-linear  tax
schedule  l(y).  r(y) is not the statutory  tax schedule  but is the 'true'  tax
schedule  faced by the household,  after taking into account deductions  and
credits  that increase  with the income  level  as well as opportunities  for tax
avoidance  and tax  evasion.
The  non-linearities  in the tax  schedule  complicate  the  model  to the  point
where the growth rate of  income cannot be computed  with pencil-and-paper
methods.  For this reason  we will focus on the growth rate of consumption
which is  analytically  more tractable.
The optimal growth rate of consumption  for a  household  with pre-tax
income  y is  a function  of T'(y),  the  marginal  tax  rate  for that  household:
2c  (y) =  (1/0){[1-T'(y)]A - p]H  (2)
The  growth  rate  of  per-capita  consumption  is:
c=  (1/C)f O(y) c(y)  g (y)  dy  (3)
0 
In this  expression  c(y) is the  optimal  level  of consumption  chosen  by an
household with  pre-tax income y,  while  C  is  the  level of  per  capita
consumption  in the  economy:  C =  IfW(y)c(y)dy.  Equation  (3)  describes  the  rate
0
of growth  at time t, not the  steady  state  growth  rate.  At present,  little  is
known  about  the  dynamics  of models  with  non-linear  income  tax  schedules.
Substituting  gc(y) from (2) in equation  (3) it is easy to see that the
growth rate of per capita  consumption  depends in a familiar  fashion  on the
real Interest  rate (A),  on the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  (1/6),
and  on the  pure rate  of time  preference  (p):
5=  (1/0)(A-p)  - (A/0)(1/C)  I  0(y)c(y)T'(y)  dy  (4)
The new determinant  of the rate  of consumption  expansion  introduced  by income
taxation  is the  consumption-weighted  average  of  marginal  tax  rates:
Q  =  (1/C)? ¢(y)  c(y)  r'(y)  dy.  (5)
c  ~~0
This average  marginal tax rate can in principle  be computed  using the
data from income  and expenditure  surveys that are available for different
countries. Unfortunately,  we have been unable  so far to obtain  the  breakdown
of consumption  by income  classes  that  is  needed  to  compute  0C.2
20ne alternative  strategy  for calculating  a consumption-weighted  marginal  tax
rate  would  be to  compute  numerically  the  policy  function  c(y) for  given  values
3In the  next section,  we focus  on the  average  marginal  tax rate  which  can
be computed  with the data that Is currently  available--the  Income-weighted
average  marginal  tax  rate:
Q  =  (1/Y)S #(y) y T'  (y) dy  (6)
y 
where  Y denotes  per capita  income  defined  as:  Y - W  0(y)  y dy.
0
III. Computiaig  an average  marginal  tax  rate
The  average  marginal  tax  rate  can  be computed  using  individual  data  on
incomes  and associated  taxes,  as in Barro and Sahasakul (1983,1986)  and In
Gouveia  and  Strauss  (1992). Unfortunately,  due to the  unavailability  of data,
there  are  no studies  of this  type  for  countries  other  than  the  U.S.
Our method  for computing  Q  makes use of all the information  on income
taxation that may be  obtainable for  a  broad set of  countries:  income
distribution  data, statutory tax rates and  information  on  the  amount of
revenue  collected.
The  key assumption  that  underlies  our  method  for  computing  Cy is that  the
marginal  tax  rate  schedule  has  a logistic  functional  form:
a aQ(Y)  =  - (7)
1  +  a Iexp(-a 2 Y)
This function  implies  that  the  marginal  tax  rate takes  values  between  two
thresholds: a /(1+aI)  (the  lowest  rate)  and a  (the  highest  rate).  For  each
of A, 0 and  p, and  of the  parameters  of the  functional  form that  describes  the
tax  schedule  x(y).
4country  we set ao equal to the highest,  statutory  rate for 1984 reported  by
Sicat and Virmani (1988). We experimented  with two procedures  for computing
a1.
The first procedure involves  choosing  a  so that a  /(l+a  )  coincides
I  ~~0  1
with the lowest  statutory  rate reported  in Sicat and Virmani (1988).  This
assumes that there is no tax evasion associated  with the first dollar of
income  earned.  Thus it rules out situations  in which, by tax evasion or
avoidance,  it is possible  to shelter  a fraction  a  of all income  earned (in
this case ao/(l+a  )  should  be equal to a fraction  a  of the lowest  statutory
rate).  When we applied this method  we found that about two thirds  of the
countries  in our sample  generated less revenue than the one that would be
collected  by implementing  a linear  tax with a rate that coincides  with the
lowest  statutory  rate.  To avoid  excluding  these  countries  from the sample  we
divided iteratively  the lowest  statutory  rate by 2 until our algorithm to
choose  a2 (described  below)  converged.
The second procedure involves  ignoring  the information  on the lowest
statutory  rate and simply  setting  a  to zero, so that ao/(l+a  )=0.3  The two
methods  produce  similar  values  for the simple  average  of marginal  tax rates,
but the second  method  produces  significantly  higher  income-weighted  marginal
tax rates.  However, the correlation  between the  income-weighted  average
marginal  tax  rates  obtained  under  the  two  methods  is extremely  high:  93%.
Defining y  as the Income threshold  that corresponds  to zero taxation
(i.e.  the  value y such that  T(y) =  0), we can  write the tax  schedule  implied
by equation  (7)  as:
T(y)  =  aoy  + (a 0/a 2) log(l  + a,  exp(-a 2y)] + a3  for  y >  y  (8)
T(y)  =  0  for  y < y
3For computational  reasons  we set  ao/(l+al)  equal  to  0.001.
5The  information  reported in Sicat and Virmani (1988) for the income
threshold  that  corresponds  to zero  income  tax  was used to choose  a3.
Finally,  the parameter  a2 in equations  (7)  and (8)  was chosen  to ensure
that the tax revenue  implied  by the tax  schedule  T(y) coincides  with the tax
revenue  that  was actuallv collected: 4
Tax  Revenue  Collected  =  0  +(y)  -r(y)  dy  (9)
0
The data on the  amount  of personal  income  tax revenue  collected  In 1984
was  obtained from the  International  Monetary Fund's Government  Financial
Statistics.
This revenue  consistency  requirement  allows  us to correct  the statutory
tax schedule to account for tax avoidance  and tax evasion as well as for
deductions  and credits.  This requirement  Implies  that countries  that have
high statutory  schedules  but collect  very little  revenue  have a r(y)  schedule
that is close to the low tax rate for the levels  of income  where there is
significant  probability  mass.
Using the amount  of revenue  collected  to choose the shape of the tax
function  is likely  to underestimate  the  distortions  caused  by taxation; it is
possible  to significantly  distort  behavior  while generating little  revenue.
An extreme  example  of this bias would  be present  if the income  tax schedule
entailed two tax rates, a zero tax rate for Incomes up to y  and a 100%
0 marginal tax rate for incomes  above y . With this tax system it would be
unlikely  to  observe  Incomes  above  y ;  the  tax  collected  would  be zero  and  our
method would produce a zero average  marginal tax rate.  However, this tax
system  is  far from  being  distortion  free:  the  relevant  marginal  tax  rate,  for
households  with  income  y  is 100%.  This bias toward  underestimating  tax
4The integration  in  condition  (9)  was  carried  out  numerically  between  zero  and
exp(P+4o-).
6distortions  is likely  to-be small  when governments  are rational. Optimizing
governments  will avoid tax schedules that generate large distortions  but
little  revenue.
To implement  the  revenue  consistency  condition  in equation  (9)  we need to
know the Income  p.d.f.  0(y).  We assumed that income  follows  a log-normal
distribution: 5
0(y)  =  I1  exp(-(log(y)-#.)  2/(202)]  (10)
(2n)  Y
where  p  and  a  are, respectively,  the  mean  and  variance  of log(y).6
For each country  the  parameter  o-  was chosen  to be the  one that  minimizes
the  sum of the  absolute  differences  between  the  empirical  Lorenz  curve  and the
theoretical  Lorenz  curve  implied  by the  lognormaL  distribution:
@(x)  =  N[N1 (x)-aI  (11)
In this  equation  £(x), represents  the fraction  of aggregate  income  held
by  the  poorest x%  of  the  population, N(.)  is  the  cumulative normal
distribution and N- 1(.)  its inverse. 7 All calculations  were carried  out by
5Instead  of fitting  a continuous  distribution,  such  as the  lognormal,  we could
alternatively  use the discrete  distribution  that Is implicit  in the Lorenz
curve.
6The widespread  use of the lognormal  p.d.f to describe  the distribution  of
income  is justified  by Its  convenient  properties  (summarized  in Aitchison  and
Brown (1969))  and by the fact that it is the ergodic distribution  of an
economy  with uninsurable  idiosyncratic  shocks  to income  (Champernowne  (1953)).
The lognormal  distribution  tends,  however,  to  be rejected  in  large  samples  and
to be outperformed  by  the Singh-Maddala  and  the gamma distribution (see
McDonald (1984)  and McDonald  and Ransom (1979)).  Given the high level  of
aggregation  of our data it Is however  unlikely  to be worthwhile  to consider
more  complex  density  functions.
7The  value  of a  could  alternatively  have  been chosen  by using  data  on the  Gini
coefficient (GC) together with  the fact  that the  lognormal distribution
implies the following relation between 0  and  the Gini  coefficient (see
7using  Lorenz  curves  expressed  in terms  of quintiles  and of the  upper  decile.
Our income  distribution  data was obtained  from the  World  Bank data base with
the exception of data for Zimbabwe, Chile, Mexico and Tunisia, which we
extracted  from Jain (1975),  and data for Portugal,  which we obtained  from
Gouveia  and Tavares  (1992). While the  Lorenz  curves  used for  our calculations
should  correspond  to pre-tax  income,  our  data sources  fail to ln:icate  whether
they  correspond  to  pre-tax  or  after-tax  income. 8
We followed  Sicat and Virmani (1988)  in assuming  that the income  tax is
paid at the level  of the  household  and that  each  household  has 5 members. The
value of 1s  was chosen  so that the mean value of y coincides  with household
income,  using the fact that the mean of income  is equal to exp[l4+(1/2)o2  ].
Household Income  was computed  as five times personal Income,  which is the
income  concept  reported  in the  National  Income  Accounts  that is  closest  to the
Income tax base.  The income  tax base in the sample used by Gouveia and
Strauss (1992)  in their  estimation  of U.S. marginal  tax rates represents  on
average,  from 1979 to 1987,  81% of personal  income. 9 In countries  for which
there  is no personal  income  data,  we extrapolated  the  ratio  of personal  income
in GDP by running  a regression  of this  ratio  on the  Summers  and  Heston (1990)
purchasing-parity-power-adjusted  real income in 1980.10  Improving  on this
Aitchison  and  Brown (1969)): GC =  2 N[o/(2  5 )]  - 1.
8Data on income  distribution  are  extremely  scarce. For this reason  we had to
resort  to estimates  of the  Lorenz  curve  obtained  in  different  time  periods  for
different countries.  The  complete list of countries  and associated time
periods is as  follows:  Argentina (1961), Brazil  (1983), Chile  (1968),
Colombia (1988),  C6te d'Ivoire (1987),  Egypt (1974),  Ghana  (1988),  Greece
(1959),  Guatemala (1979), India (1983), Indonesia (1987), Ireland (1973),
Jamaica (1988),  Japan (1979),  Korea (1970),  Malaysia (1987),  Mexico (1969),
Morocco (1984),  Pakistan (1984),  Peru (1985),  Philippines  (1985),  Portugal
(1990),  Senegal (1960),  Singapore  (1982),  Sri Lan&a (1985),  Tanzania  (1969),
Thailand (1976),  Tunisia (1961),  Turkey (1968),  U.S. (1985),  Zambia (1959),
Zimbabwe  (1965).  Depending on  avallabil:t.';  the  data  refers  to  the
distribution  of household  income  or of individual  income.
9See  Park (1992)  for  a detailed  discussion  of the  differences  between  personal
income  and  adjusted  gross income.
10We used 30 a sample  of observations,  which Included  mostly  OECD countries.
The  regression results  were  (t-statistics in  parenthesis):  Personal
8extrapolation  procedure  would greatly enhance the quality of our tax rate
estimates.
The value of u  allows  us to calculate  a2 using the revenue  consistency
requirement  and proceed  to compute  the  marginal  tax schedule,  as well as its
income-weighted  average  Ql.
Table 1 summarizes  some  of the information  used to produce  our marginal
tax  rate estimates: T  (the  estimate  of the  standard  deviation  of log(y)),  the
fraction of personal income in GDP  (countries  for which this number was
extrapolated  are marked  with an  (e)),  the lowest  and highest statutory  tax
rate, the income  threshold  y, and the revenue  collected  (both  expressed  as a
fraction  of personal  income).  Table 2 reports  our estimates  for the simple
and  income-weighted  marginal tax rate computed using the two methods for
choosing  a,  described  before. Column  3 of this  table  reports  the  value  of the
lowest effective rate  (a  /(l+a1)) adopted as  a  fraction of  the  lowest
statutory  rate.  The measures  of income-weighted  marginal  tax rates reported
In Columns (2)  and (5)  of Table  2 are depicted  In Figure 1.  In Figure  2 we
compare the marginal  tax rates reported  in Column  5 with the ratio between
revenue  and  personal  income. The  correlation  between  these  two  series  is .95.
Our marginal income tax rate estimates are closest in spirit to the
'effective  tax rates' computed  by Gouveia and Strauss (1992)  by regressing
individual  taxes on individual  incomes,  using a non-linear  functional  form
suggested  by the equal sacrifice  theory  of taxation.  Our estimates  for the
U.S. (12%  for the  simple  average  and  24% for the income-weighted  average)  are
higher  than their  estimates  for 1984 (14%  for the simple  average  and and 18%
for the income-weighted  average)  but lower  than Barro and Sahasakul's  (1986)
income-weighted  marginal  tax  estimate  for 1983:  27.2%.11 The Barro-Sahasakul
Income/GDP  = 0.23  +  0.07xSummers-Heston  GDP.  The R2 of this regression  is
(0.92)  (2.44)
0.20.
1lGouveia  and Strauss'  (1992)  estimates  for the  period  1979-1987  range  between
18%  and 14% (for  the  simple  average)  and  between  18%  and 24% (for  the  weighted
9estimates  are higher  because they  use the marginal  statutory  rate to measure
the  additional  tax liability  in which a household  will incur if It earns an
additional  dollar  of income.  The Gouveia-Strauss  measure takes into  account
the  marginal  tax  actually  paid  when an extra  dollar  Is  earned.  This  marginal
tax is lower than the statutory  rate because  with an additional  dollar  new
opportunities  for  deductions,  credits,  tax  avoidance  and tax  evasion  arise.
Whether statutory  rates  or effective  rates (that is the additional  tax
effectively  paid If the  household  earns  an extra  dollar)  are relevant  depends
on the type of decision  being  considered. If as income  goes up, deductions,
credits and  opportunities for  tax  evasion automatically increase, the
effective  tax rate is the one that determines  household's  behavior.  But if
deductions,  credits  and tax evasion  require  re-arranging  the consumption  and
production  patterns  of the household,  It is the statutory  tax rate that Is
relevant.
As a test of the results  produced  by our method  we multiplied  the  U.S.
personal  income  by 81% (the  ratio  of the  income  tax  base to personal  income  in
the Gouveia-Strauss  (1992)  sample), choosing  ao/(i+a 1)  to be equal to the
lowest statutory rate (0.11).  We  obtained estimates for the simple and
income-weighted  average  marginal  rates of 14% and 17%, respectively. These
estimates  turn  out to be remarkably  close  to the  ones obtained  by Gouvela  and
Strauss (1992): 14%  and 18%,  respectively. Partly  for this reason,  we view
the estimates  reported  in columns (4)  and (5) (which  use information  on the
lowest  statutory  rate)  as the  most  plausible.
As we would expect,  there is a positive  correlation  between  our income-
weighted  average  marginal  tax rates  and the level  of real per capita  income.
This simply  reflects  the fact that developed  economies  tend to rely more on
income  taxes  than less  developed  countries.
Even though our marginal tax rate estimates are very preliminary  we
average).  The Barro-Sahasakul  estimates  range between 29% and 31% for the
period  1979-83.
10investigated  whether  they  would  have explanatory  power  in a Barro (1991)-type
cross-country  regression. We regressed  the least  squares  growth  rate of per
capita  consumption  for the  period  from 1970  to 1988  on the level  of real per
capita GDP  in 1970, on proxies for human capital (primary  and secondary
enrollment  in 1960),  measures  of political  instability  (number  of revolutions
and coups  and of assassinations  from 1970  to 1985).12 We obtained  a negative
but statistically  insignificant  coefficient  when we included  (one  at a time)
our two measures  of marginal lncome  tax rates, reported  in columns (2) and
(5).  In fact, probably as  a  result of  the  extremely small number of
observations,  we could  not reject  the  hypothesis  that the coefficients  on all
the regressors  In the  equation  are zero.  It is clearly  essential  to enlarge
the  sample  before  proceeding  with  an in-depth  cross-section  study.
IV.  Conclusion
In  this  paper we  computed average marginal tax  rates for  various
countries  combining  information  on statutory  rates  as well as data on income
distribution  and on the amount  of income  tax revenue  collected.  Our method
relies  heavily  of the  assumption  that  the  marginal  tax  schedule  has  a logistic
form.  Despite  this  handicap,  we hope that  our method  stands  a better  chance
of measuring the relevant average marginal tax rate than the widely used
alternative  of assuming (implicitly  or explicitly)  that the income tax is
proportional.
Our  estimates of  average marginal tax  rates  can  be  significantly
improved,  both in terms  of country  coverage  and in terms  of the  quality  of the
underlying  data.  The number  of countries  in our sample  can be significantly
enlarged  by collecting  data on the statutory  income  tax  schedules  of the  OECD
countries  that  were excluded  from the  Sicat-Virmani  (1988)  study.  One avenue
for improving  the quality  of our estimates involves  improving  the personal
12We used the least  squares  growth  rate instead  of the  mean geometric  growth
rate in light  of Watson's  (1992)  finding  that  the  first  estimator  is robust  to
the  presence  of errors  of I(1)  or I(O)  form.
11income  estimates  and obtaining  more information  on the relation  between  this
concept and  the base of the income tax.  The possibility  of estimating
marginal  Income  tax rates  suggests  two lines  of research:  the study of the
properties  of models with non-linear  income taxes and the search for the
adequate  empirical  strategies  to test  those  models  with  cross-country  data.
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14TABLE 1
Lowest  Highest
Revenue  Marginal  Marginal  Income  Personal
Personal  Statutory  Statutory  Threshold  Income
Income  Tax  Rate  Tax  Rate  Personal  GDP
Income
Argentina .7881  .0002  .064  .54  1.4536  0.7980(e)
Brazil  1.1708  .0338  .05  .60  .7412  0.7960(e)
Chile  .9555  .0159  .08  .54  1.1772  0.8070
Colombia  .9253  .0175  .07  .49  .0706  0.8500
C.d'Ivoire  .9145  .0229  .025  .725  0.0000  0.7340(e)
Egypt  .7504  .0063  .02  .73  .4564  0.7230
Ghana  .6594  .0088  .05  .60  .0288  0.6940(e)
Greece  .7000  .0557  .121  .69  .6221  0.8680
Guatemala  .9750  .0040  .050  .48  1.6579  0.7 600 (e)
India  .6001  .0126  .33  .62  2.3529  0.6630(e)
Indonesia .5868  .0107  .15  .35  1.7942  0.7190(e)
Ireland  .5946  .1466  .35  .66  .1956  0.8180
Jamaica  .8269  .0763  .30  .575  .5952  0.7560(e)
Japan  .3987  .0523  .145  .84  .1247  0.8820
Korea  .7026  .0263  .071  .701  .4887  0.7980
Malaysia  .8750  .0312  .06  .55  .5912  0.7950(e)
Mexico  1.1398  .0225  .031  .55  .1722  0.8130(e)
Morocco  .5344  .0315  .003  .802  0.0000  0.7400(e)
Pakistan  .7332  .0101  .15  .60  1.2518  0.7033(e)
Peru  .8975  .0014  .02  .65  1.0049  0.8160
Philippines.7995  .0104  .01  .35  .5598  0.7860
Portugal  .6748  .0265  .055  .955  .1783  1.2220
Senegal  1.1334  .0342  .05  .65  .6931  0.7070(e)
Slngapore  .8241  .1030  .036  .405  .0956  0.8370(e)
Sri  Lanka  1.0057  .0143  .093  .615  .3722  0.8060
Tanzania  .7873  .0276  .20  .95  1.0648  0.6480(e)
Thailand  .8104  .0230  .07  .65  .6300  0.7460(e)
Tunisia  .9865  .0261  .053  .893  .2474  0.7680(e)
Turkey  1.0981  .0763  .36  .65  .0780  0.7690(e)
U.S.  .6965  .0949  .11  .50  .1418  0.8460
Zambia  1.0030  .0410  .05  .80  1.3941  0.5380
Zimbabwe  1.2852  .1090  .12  .63  .4603  0.7170(e)
The  symbol  (e)  denotes  observations that  were  obtalned  by  extrapolating on  the
basis  of  a  regrension with  r  sample  of  30  observations, which  Included mostly
OECD  countries.  The  regression  results  were  (t-statlstlcs  In  parenthesis):
Personal  Income/GDP  =  0.23  + 0.07XSummers-Heston  GDP.  The R2 Is 0.20.
(0.92)  (2.44)
15TABLE 2
AVERAGE  MARGINAL  TAX  RATES
Computed  with ao  =  0  Computed  with  ao/(1+al)=Lowest
Statutory  Rate x Factor  in
Column  (3)
Simple  Income-weighted  Factor Simple  Income-weighted
Average  Average  Average  Average
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Argentina  2.3799e-4  6.1108e-4  0.0156  2.3799e-4  6.1108e-4
Brazil  0.0094  0.0852  1.0000  0.0217  0.0578
Chile  0.0074  0.0479  0.5000  0.0125  0.0330
Colombia  0.0100  0.0502  0.2500  0.0184  0.0201
C.d'Ivoire  0.0128  0.0679  0.5000  0.0198  0.0400
Egypt  0.0056  0.0220  0.5000  0.0080  0.0102
Ghana  0.0099  0.0294  0.1250  0.0098  0.0130
Greece  0.0648  0.1988  1.0000  0.0766  0.1036
Guatemala  0.0016  0.0137  0.2500  0.0026  0.0094
India  0.0169  0.0557  1.0000  0.0173  0.0537
Indonesia  0.0158  0.0441  1.0000  0.0164  0.0404
Ireland  0.2350  0.3726  0.5000  0.1822  0.1869
Jamaica  0.0685  0.1946  0.5000  0.0887  0.1298
Japan  0.1328  0.2047  0.2500  0.0750  0.0850
Korea  0.0282  0.0878  0.5000  0.0351  0.0490
Malaysia  0.0212  0.0893  1.0000  0.0342  0.0516
Mexico  0.0069  0.0589  0.5000  0.0169  0.0390
Morocco  0.0545  0.1156  1.0000  0.0519  0.1019
Pakistan  0.0090  0.0370  0.2500  0.0118  0.0260
Peru  9.5044e-4  0.0048  0.1250  0.0012  0.0034
Philippines  0.0085  0.0327  1.0000  0.0113  0.0228
Portugal  0.0298  0.0928  0.5000  0.0321  0.0359
Senegal  0.0105  0.0883  1.0000  0.0237  0.0584
Singapore  0.1058  0.2215  1.0000  0.1078  0.1814
Sri  Lanka  0.0060  0.0108  0.1250  0.0116  0.0279
Tanzania  0.0216  0.0929  0.2500  0.0286  0.0691
Thailand  0.0177  0.0728  0.5000  0.0260  0.0448
Tunisia  0.0114  0.0771  0.5000  0.0257  0.0395
Turkey  0.0331  0.1752  0.1250  0.0614  0.1222
U.S.  0.1217  0.2363  1.0000  0.1099  0.1109
Zambia  0.0178  0.1137  1.0000  0.0240  0.0979
Zimbabwe  0.0333  0.2187  1.0000  0.0684  0.1666
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